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Abstract
This paper casts light on the ongoing debate about whether emerging markets
have decoupled from advanced economies. The proponents of the decoupling hypoth-
esis argue that emerging markets have made significant progress in reducing external
vulnerabilities, strengthening domestic policy frameworks, and achieving stronger
domestic demand growth, thereby leading to lower business cycle comovements with
advanced economies. This view runs against extensive empirical evidence showing
that globalization, namely rising trade and financial integration, raises business cycle
synchronisation. We find that decoupling is a myth: business cycle synchronicity
between emerging markets and advanced economies has generally not declined in
recent years.
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1 Introduction
As the old adage goes, “when the United States sneeze, the rest of the world catches
a cold”. Is this still true? There has been an ongoing debate about whether emerging
market economies have decoupled from advanced economies, in the sense that in recent
years, the business cycle of emerging markets has become more (or fully) independent from
the business cycle of advanced economies. The proponents of the decoupling view argue
that emerging markets have made significant progress in reducing external vulnerabili-
ties, strengthening domestic policy frameworks, and achieving stronger domestic demand
growth, thereby leading to lower business cycle comovements with advanced economies.
This view runs against the idea that globalisation enhances trade linkages and interna-
tional financial integration, allowing for a stronger transmission of country-specific shocks
across countries and hence, stronger business cycle comovements. The decoupling view is
difficult to reconcile with the significant empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that
trade and financial integration lead to greater business cycle synchronisation.
Much of the current debate about the decoupling hypothesis relies on arguments. In
contrast, this paper provides detailed empirical evidence on the degree of business cycle
synchronicity between emerging market economies and four aggregate groups, respectively
all advanced economies, the G7 club, the United States and the European Union. Business
cycles are defined as output gaps, instead of growth rates as in some previous studies. Given
the methodological shortcomings of correlation coefficients as a measure of business cycle
synchronisation, we use instead the synchronicity measure proposed by Mink et al. (2007).
We find that decoupling is largely a myth. Business cycle synchronicity has generally not
declined in recent years and thus, emerging markets have not decoupled from advanced
economies.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
dealing with the links between globalization, economic integration and business cycles.
Much of the discussion aims at motivating the methodology used in this paper, which
allows for a precise definition and proper measurement of business cycle synchronicity. The
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empirical approach is presented in section 3, while section 4 describes the data. Section 5
presents our results and section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
Business cycle synchronisation arises from two types of shocks. On the one hand, common
external shocks affect many countries simultaneously, though not necessarily to the same
extent, e.g. oil price shocks. On the other hand, country-specific shocks are transmitted
to other countries through trade and financial linkages. The literature on business cycle
synchronisation focuses on the effects of both types of shocks and asks two main questions1.
First, have business cycles become more similar across countries over time? Second, what
are the determinants of the degree of business cycle synchronisation?
2.1 Assessing the degree of business cycle synchronisation
Synchronisation has been measured using different variables and methodologies, and var-
ious definitions of synchronisation have been proposed. The analysis always starts with
the selection of a macroeconomic variable which can be used to produce a measure of the
business cycle. Studies have used either monthly industrial production or quarterly or
annual gross domestic product (GDP). Industrial production is available at a relatively
high frequency, which is useful to compute various measures of synchronisation such as
correlation coefficients. However, it is far from representing the whole economy, given the
significant decline in the share of manufacturing in the economy. Consequently, it is usu-
ally agreed that gross domestic product is a more adequate variable. Quarterly GDP is
typically thought of as being more appropriate to identify the business cycle. However, it
is not available for a large number of countries, in particular emerging market economies,
and for long time spans. Since we focus on a relatively large sample of emerging markets
and advanced economies over a long period of time, we will therefore focus on annual GDP
in our study.
1See de Haan et al. (2008) for a survey of the literature, with particular reference to the euro area.
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The usual approach to assessing the degree of business cycle synchronisation is to
compute a correlation coefficient between the business cycle of an individual country or
a group of countries, and the business cycle of another country or group of countries.
The evolution of synchronisation over time can be studied by computing such correlation
coefficients over different sub-samples of the data, or using rolling correlation coefficients2.
Even though correlation coefficients have been widely used and remain easy to interpret,
they suffer from several problems. The choice of sub-sample remains largely arbitrary
and different sub-samples of the same data can yield different conclusions. For example,
Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999) have concluded that participation in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of mutually fixed exchange rates raised business cycle synchronisation, while
Inklaar and de Haan (2001) reached the opposite conclusion using the same dataset but
splitting the sample in different sub-periods of time. Rolling correlation coefficients avoid
the need for defining arbitrary sub-periods. Still, one must define a moving window over
which correlations are calculated, and decide around which year this window is centered.
Last but not least, overlapping windows lead to serial correlation by construction.
Correlation coefficients also face one important conceptual difficulty in that they mix
two characteristics of the business cycle: synchronicity and amplitude. As noted by Mink
et al. (2007), we think intuitively about synchronisation as occurring when two countries
are in the same phase of the business cycle, whether an expansion or a slowdown/recession.
The correlation coefficient contains more information than that. It will change when the
amplitude of business cycles changes, even though synchronicity remains unchanged. We
know that many countries have experienced a decrease in the volatility of their business cy-
cles over the last twenty years (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Dalsgaard et al., 2002),
a phenomenon referred to as the Great Moderation. As a result, it is difficult to interpret
changes in correlation coefficients purely as changes in the degree of synchronisation when
volatility changes (Doyle and Faust, 2002; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
2An increase in the correlation coefficient over time is very often interpreted as evidence of higher
business cycle synchronisation. Surprisingly, however, very few studies actually test whether this increase
is statistically significant. Doyle and Faust (2005) develop an appropriate test and conclude that there is
very little evidence that correlations have increased significantly, in a statistical sense, over time.
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Beyond simple correlation coefficients, one approach which is gaining importance is
factor models. Kose et al. (2008) have used this approach to cast light on the decoupling
debate. The idea is to decompose the rate of growth of real GDP into three factors: a
global factor common to all countries, a factor common to different types of economies, and
a country-specific factor3. There are three types of economies: advanced, emerging mar-
ket, and developing economies. The evolution of business cycle similarities is assessed by
estimating the factor model over different time periods. Kose et al. (2008) split their sam-
ple in two sub-samples, the pre-globalization period 1960-1984 and the post-globalization
period 1985-2005. They find that national business cycles have not generally become more
synchronized during the post-globalization period. Moreover, during this same period,
the share of the variation in growth rates explained by the common factor has decreased,
whereas the share explained by the economy-type factor has increased for both advanced
and emerging market economies. Hence, it appears that there has been some decoupling
between advanced economies and emerging markets, but stronger convergence in growth
rates within types of economies. Hence, Kose et al. (2008) provide nuanced support for
the decoupling hypothesis.
There is one major problem with this interpretation and it comes from the definition
of the business cycle. Typically, the business cycle is obtained by filtering out the time-
varying trend from macroeconomic time series on output. Looking at both the original
series and the computed time trend, we can identify time periods during which output
is above or below trend. Dividing this difference by trend GDP yields the output gap.
In contrast, Kose et al. (2008) make use of output growth rates and call these business
cycle fluctuations. We argue that defining the business cycle as output growth rates and
choosing the mid-1980s as the cutting point to split the sample in two time periods could
very likely produce the kind of results that they have obtained.
Why? Starting in the early 1990s, many emerging markets have experienced a take-off
3Kose et al. (2008) employ a more sophisticated model by considering not only output but also in-
vestment and consumption. It is possible to extract variation from the data which is not only common to
all countries, but also common to all countries and all variables. For the sake of the exposition, we focus
solely on output.
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Figure 1: Actual and trend growth rates for advanced economies and emerging market and
developing countries
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2008.
in economic growth. Output growth rates have become much higher in emerging mar-
kets than in advanced economies4. Moreover, the trend growth rate of emerging markets
has also increased noticeably and diverged away from the trend growth rate of advanced
economies (see Figure 1). This increased divergence has two important lessons. First,
business cycle fluctuations, defined in the usual manner as an output gap, could remain
highly similar even though actual and trend growth rates diverge significantly across re-
gions. Even though both are rising, the difference between them could remain identical or
even decrease. Second, it is no surprise that Kose et al. (2008) conclude that decoupling
has taken place across regions, but not within regions. When growth rates become so
different across regions, the share of the variation in growth rates explained by the com-
mon factor will decrease. Moreover, because growth rates were generally high throughout
emerging markets, it is also no surprise that greater synchronisation should show up within
4Indeed, those economies which are now called emerging markets are those which have grown very fast
and graduated from being developing economies.
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regions. In general, we should really use output data and filters to describe business cycle
fluctuations, not growth rates.
2.2 Determinants of business cycle synchronisation
Business cycle synchronisation results from common external shocks as well as the trans-
mission of country-specific shocks through various macroeconomic channels such as inter-
national trade in goods and financial assets. Theoretical predictions remain ambiguous and
assessing the contribution of specific economic linkages to business cycle synchronisation
remains ultimately an empirical question. In this section, we review the main theoretical
background and empirical findings.
2.2.1 Trade integration
Although international trade in goods is usually thought of as fostering business cycle
synchronisation, its overall effects remain theoretically ambiguous. On the demand side,
higher aggregate demand in one country will partially fall on imported goods, thereby
raising the output and income of trading partners and inducing output comovements across
countries. On the supply side, however, there are two opposite effects which relate to
two different approaches to modeling international trade. Intra-industry models of trade
consider economies with similar production structures and factor endowments. To the
extent that trade occurs mostly within industries, an expansion in some industries will
raise output comovements across countries. However, trade integration may also lead
economies to specialize in the production of goods for which they have a comparative
advantage, hence reducing comovements.
Frankel and Rose (1998) find strong evidence that closer trade linkages among advanced
economies lead to an increase in the correlation of business cycles. Calderon et al. (2007)
find similar evidence for developing countries, for which we could expect that specialization
along the lines of comparative advantage is more important. Otto et al. (2001) and Bordo
and Helbling (2004) conclude that international trade affects output comovements in a
positive and significant way, although it does not explain very much. Baxter and Koupar-
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itsas (2005) use the robustness approach of Leamer (1983) to detect robust determinants of
business cycle synchronisation and conclude that bilateral trade has a robust effect. Imbs
(2004) refines the analysis by estimating the respective contributions of intra-industry and
inter-industry trade, and concludes that a sizable part of the impact of trade on bilateral
correlations works through intra-industry trade, although there are some smaller but sig-
nificant inter-industry effects. Overall, we conclude from the existing empirical evidence
that stronger trade linkages lead to greater business cycle synchronisation.
2.2.2 Financial integration
At a theoretical level, financial integration also carries an ambiguous impact on business
cycle synchronisation. On the one hand, to the extent that equities of a given country
are widely held internationally, a fall in that country’s stock market will trigger a negative
wealth effect for asset holders in the world, thereby affecting consumer demand and in
turn leading to output comovements. On the other hand, international diversification of
portfolios allows to smooth consumption patterns without having to diversify production,
thereby leading to the possibility of greater specialization. The former effect would increase
business cycle synchronisation, whereas the latter effect would tend to reduce comovements.
Imbs (2004, 2006), Inklaar et al. (2008) and Kose et al. (2003) show that financial
integration impacts positively on business cycle comovements. Bordo and Helbling (2004)
conclude that financial integration has no significant effect. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)
show that capital market integration leads to greater specialisation in production structures
and thus, other things equal, a lower degree of output comovements. Hence, there is a
substantial body of evidence suggesting that financial globalization raises business cycle
synchronisation. The ongoing global financial crisis is also showing us that financial linkages
can transmit country-specific disturbances across countries very rapidly.
2.2.3 Other determinants
At least three other determinants of business cycle synchronisation have received attention
in the literature. We outline them briefly here. First, lower exchange rate volatility could
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raise business cycle comovements by fostering trade integration and financial integration.
Rose and Engel (2002) conclude that currency unions bring about higher business cycle
synchronisation. Rose (2000), Glick and Rose (2002), Micco et al. (2003) and Baldwin
(2006) estimate versions of gravity equations and find that currency unions raise bilateral
trade across countries. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Cappiello et al. (2006) show
that the introduction of the euro has also led to greater financial integration.
Second, fiscal convergence could also lead to greater business cycle synchronisation
because of lower idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Inklaar et al. (2008) and Darvas et al. (2005)
find supporting evidence. Finally, several studies have assessed the role of similarities in
the industrial structure of countries. Imbs (2004), Calderon et al. (2007) and Inklaar et al.
(2008) provide evidence that more symmetric economic structures induce greater business
cycle comovements.
3 Methodology
The review of the literature provides several insights which are helpful in choosing an
appropriate methodology. Given that industrial production now represents a small share
of the economy in many countries, and given that quarterly data on gross domestic product
are not available for all countries in our sample, we focus on gross domestic product at
the annual frequency. In order to avoid the problems associated with growth rates, we
will compute output gaps as a measure of the business cycle. Finally, since correlation
coefficients feature several drawbacks, we will instead use the nonparametric measure of
synchronicity proposed by Mink et al. (2007).
The degree of synchronicity between the output gap of emerging market i, denoted as
gi(t), and the output gap of a group of advanced economies a, written as ga(t), in a given
year t is given by
ϕia(t) =
gi(t)ga(t)
|gi(t)ga(t)| (1)
When the business cycles of country i and group a are in the same phase, that is
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when both output gaps are positive or when both are negative, they are synchronous and
the indicator is equal to 1. Otherwise, it is equal to -1. In contrast with factor models
or correlation coefficients, this concordance measure has the advantage that it can be
computed for every year on the basis of annual gross domestic product data. There is no
need for higher frequency data and it is not necessary to define arbitrary sub-periods of the
data. This synchronicity measure will remain unaffected by changes in the amplitude of
business cycles. The only thing that matters is whether both countries experience output
gaps of the same sign or not.
In this context, decoupling is easily defined. In the extreme version of the decoupling
hypothesis, emerging markets will decouple from advanced economies when the concor-
dance indicator converges to -1, that is when their output gaps do not coincide at all.
In the milder, current version of the hypothesis, decoupling will occur when the concor-
dance between the business cycles decreases over time, that is when the business cycles of
emerging markets become less synchronised with those of advanced economies. Since the
concordance indicator exhibits substantial time variation, the evolution of the degree of
synchronicity over time is examined by extracting the time-varying trend across the full
sample.
Synchronicity of business cycles can also be examined between a group of emerging
market economies and a group of advanced economies. The more aggregate measure of
synchronicity is taken again from Mink et al. (2007) and is given by
ϕra(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(t)ga(t)
|gi(t)ga(t)| (2)
where r denotes either a geographical region of emerging markets, or the whole group
of emerging market economies, and N is the number of countries within this region.
4 Data
Data on gross domestic product for each country in our sample are retrieved from the
October 2008 World Economic Outlook database provided by the IMF on its website.
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These data series are available at the annual frequency from 1980 onwards. Gross domestic
product is given at constant prices. We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the time-
varying trend from the original data5. The output gap is computed as the difference
between actual GDP and trend GDP, divided by trend GDP.
We consider a large sample of thirty-four emerging market countries from different re-
gions of the world: eight Asian economies (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam), nine Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela), thirteen Eastern Euro-
pean economies (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine), and four other nations (Egypt,
Jordan, Morocco and South Africa). We will compute the synchronicity measure between
the output gap of each emerging market economy and the output gap of four separate
groups: advanced economies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Ko-
rea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States), the G7 group (Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), the United States alone,
and a European group (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United King-
dom)6. We will also use equation (2) to compute the synchronicity measure for emerging
market economies aggregated in regional groups, and in a single group, with respect to
each of the four groups of advanced economies.
The time period for our estimations runs from 1980 to 2007. The proponents of the
decoupling hypothesis argue that it is a recent phenomenon. It is therefore essential to use
the most recent data available. Yet, we did not include data for 2008 because the global
financial crisis has led to a global slowdown, with many countries entering into recession. It
5We make use of a penalty parameter of 4 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
6We have calculated the output gap of aggregate groups of advanced economies using PPP GDP shares
as weights.
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is a well-established fact that business cycles are more synchronised during recessions than
during normal times (Claessens et al., 2008). Including data for 2008 would therefore have
worked against the decoupling hypothesis. The ongoing global crisis is a rather unusual
event, so we did not want to draw conclusions based partly on extraordinary circumstances.
Hence, our sample period stops at 2007.
5 Results
Have emerging markets decoupled from advanced economies, the United States, the G7
group, or Europe? In other words, has the degree of synchronicity of business cycles
decreased over time, in particular during recent years? Figure 2 provides evidence for the
group of all emerging markets on the one hand, and the four aggregate groups of advanced
economies on the other hand. Synchronicity fluctuates over time; thus, we also report
the long-run trend extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Despite significant time
variation, it does not appear that synchronicity has decreased over time, and certainly
not during recent years. Hence, the decoupling hypothesis is a myth when we consider all
emerging markets together.
Despite the fact that the degree of synchronicity seems to have increased over time,
we would not necessarily conclude that this increase is statistically significant. In the
absence of a proper test for the null hypothesis that synchronicity has not changed and
the alternative hypothesis that synchronicity has risen, we can only interpret the visible
increase in synchronicity as evidence that at least, synchronicity has not decreased. Thus,
the decoupling hypothesis can be rejected on the basis of our evidence. This being said,
our evidence is consistent, in a qualitative sense, with the view that globalisation has
contributed to stronger business cycle synchronicity.
It is useful to look at smaller groups of emerging markets to assess whether the overall
picture hides significant differences across geographical regions. Figures 3 to 6 show the
synchronicity indicator between, respectively, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and
the rest of the world, and the same four aggregate groups of advanced economies. The
12
degree of synchronicity fluctuates over time. In line with our results when all emerging
markets are considered together, the decoupling hypothesis can be rejected for each of the
four geographical regions. The synchronicity indicator does not decrease for any of them
during recent years. Again, the decoupling hypothesis appears to be a myth.
Even geographical regions could hide differences across individual countries. Therefore,
we compute the synchronicity measure for each individual emerging market economy on
the one hand, and the same four aggregate groups of advanced economies on the other
hand. Figures 7 to 10 focus on Asian countries. Interestingly, a couple of countries have
experienced a modest decrease in business cycle synchronicity, in particular China with the
United States. Again, it is difficult to judge whether China has really decoupled from the
United States in a statistical sense. It is also worth noting that China has not decoupled
from all groups of advanced economies: its degree of business cycle synchronicity with
Europe has become stronger during recent years. The other big economy in the region,
namely India, has not decoupled with respect to any of the four aggregate groups of
advanced economies. Overall, none of the emerging markets in the Asian region can be
said to have decoupled from advanced economies; for each country, there is always at least
one group of advanced economies with respect to which synchronicity has not declined.
Figure 11 to 14 present the evidence for Latin America. Most countries exhibit increas-
ing synchronicity during recent years. Even though Brazil seems slightly less synchronised
with the group of all advanced economies together, its degree of synchronicity with the
United States and with Europe has not declined in recent years. Peru is the only country
in the Latin American region that reports a decline in synchronicity with each of the four
aggregate groups of advanced economies. Figures 15 to 18 focus on the Eastern European
region. Again, we cannot find a single country which exhibits lower synchronicity with all
four aggregate groups of advanced economies during recent years. Russia has even become
slightly more synchronised with the United States, despite small decreases with other ad-
vanced economies. Finally, figures 19 to 22 focus on the rest of the world. The conclusion
is the same: the decoupling hypothesis can be rejected for all four emerging markets.
Overall, we find no supporting evidence for the decoupling hypothesis. A few emerging
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market economies exhibit lower synchronicity with respect to some specific set of advanced
economies during recent years. However, out of thirty-four emerging market economies,
there is no country, except for Peru, which reports a decline in its degree of synchronicity
with all four aggregate groups of advanced economies. In most cases, synchronicity has
been rising during the last decade, until the very end of our sample period which finishes
and includes the year 2007. Our results are consistent with the growing evidence showing
that globalisation tends to foster business cycle synchronisation.
6 Concluding remarks
Much of the recent debate about the decoupling hypothesis relies on arguments rather
than detailed empirical analysis. This paper reviews the literature on the measurement of
business cycle synchronisation to motivate the empirical approach put forward by Mink
et al. (2007). In particular, we explain carefully why combining GDP growth rates with
factor models can produce the kind of results obtained by Kose et al. (2008), namely that
emerging markets have decoupled from advanced economies. Using output gaps instead
of growth rates, and focusing on a measure of business cycle synchronicity that remains
invariant to changes in the amplitude of business cycles, we find that the decoupling hy-
pothesis is largely a myth. Business cycle synchronicity between emerging markets and
advanced economies has not generally decreased over time, and certainly not during recent
years.
Our results do not imply that business cycle synchronicity will remain at its current
level permanently, or that synchronicity will necessarily rise further in the future. We would
expect synchronicity not to decline as long as the ongoing global recession continues, given
the existing evidence showing that business cycles become more synchronised in such time
periods. But our results show that the trend in the degree of business cycle synchronicity
varies over time. In this paper, we really show that at least in recent years, decoupling has
not occurred. We cannot infer from our results that decoupling cannot happen at some
point in the future. Yet, the growing evidence showing a positive relationship between
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globalisation and business cycle synchronicity would support the view that synchronicity
will not decline systematically over the world, so long as globalisation does not recede.
The measure of synchronicity proposed by Mink et al. (2007) and used in this paper
would also be suitable as a dependent variable in a regression specification focusing on
the determinants of business cycle synchronicity across countries and over time. Since
synchronicity is a binary variable, a probit model would be adequate. This contrasts with
the difficulties inherent in the estimation of regression models using a correlation coefficient
as the dependent variable. The correlation coefficient must be transformed since it is not
normally distributed, making the interpretation of the estimated regression coefficients
problematic. This problem does not occur when the dependent variable is binary. We
leave the study of the determinants of business cycle synchronicity, using the measure put
forward by Mink et al. (2007), for future research.
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Figure 2: Synchronicity: all emerging markets and four advanced groups
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Figure 3: Synchronicity: Asia and four advanced groups
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Figure 4: Synchronicity: Latin America and four advanced groups
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
SYNCHRO_LATIN_ADV
TREND_LATIN_ADV
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
SYNCHRO_LATIN_G7
TREND_LATIN_G7
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
SYNCHRO_LATIN_US
TREND_LATIN_US
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
SYNCHRO_LATIN_EUR
TREND_LATIN_EUR
20
Figure 5: Synchronicity: Eastern Europe and four advanced groups
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Figure 6: Synchronicity: Rest of the world and four advanced groups
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Figure 7: Synchronicity: Asian countries and advanced economies
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Figure 8: Synchronicity: Asian countries and the United States
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Figure 9: Synchronicity: Asian countries and the G7 group
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Figure 10: Synchronicity: Asian countries and Europe
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Figure 11: Synchronicity: Latin American countries and advanced economies
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Figure 12: Synchronicity: Latin American countries and the United States
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Figure 13: Synchronicity: Latin American countries and the G7 group
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Figure 14: Synchronicity: Latin American countries and Europe
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Figure 15: Synchronicity: Eastern European countries and advanced economies
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Figure 16: Synchronicity: Eastern European countries and the United States
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Figure 17: Synchronicity: Eastern European countries and the G7 group
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Figure 18: Synchronicity: Eastern European countries and Europe
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Figure 19: Synchronicity: Other countries and advanced economies
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Figure 20: Synchronicity: Other countries and the United States
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Figure 21: Synchronicity: Other countries and the G7 group
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Figure 22: Synchronicity: Other countries and Europe
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